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A FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATAL ACTS OF A NONFELON
People v. Hickman,
59 11. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974).

Throughout the Ango-American system of criminal justice, those
who engage in certain felonies and kill the subject of their felonious
designs, or those who kill while forcibly resisting lawful arrest, may

be convicted of murder. Where, however, death is caused by the
retaliatory or defensive action of a victim of an intended felony, or

by a police officer or other person assisting him, the criminal
responsibility of the felon for that death is less clear.'
The problem raised when a homicide is committed by a person resisting a
felony is whether the felony murder doctrine can be utilized to charge the
felon with murder. The applicability of the felony murder rule in this situation

depends on whether the court adopts a proximate cause2 or an agency' theory
of criminal liability. Adoption of the proximate cause basis for the imposition
of liability under the felony murder rule holds a felon responsible for any
death occurring during the course of the felony, which is a foreseeable
consequence of the felon's initial criminal act. Under this distinct minority
theory, which expands the common law scope of a felon's responsibility, the
felony murder doctrine is applicable when the killing is done by one resisting
the felony.
However, under the agency theory, which requires a more direct link of
causation between the original felony and the subsequent homicide, criminal
liability is imposed on the felon only when the conduct causing the death is an
act done in furtherance of the initial felony. Thus this view limits the
applicability of the felony murder rule to homicides committed by the
defendant or a co-felon in furtherance of the felony.
1. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
50 (1956).
2. The proximate cause theory of criminal liability received wide recognition in early
Pennsylvania decisions which have since been overruled. See note 34 infra.
3. The traditional application of the felony murder rule has been labelled the agency
theory of liability. Under this theory, the felony murder doctrine is inapplicable where the fatal act
is committed by one resisting the felony on the rationale that the purpose of the doctrine is to
deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly liable for the killings
they commit, and that this purpose is not served by holding them responsible for the homicidal
acts of others. See generally Annot., Felony Murder-Killing By Another, 56 A.L.R.3d 239
(1974).
4. The jurisdictions currently adopting the proximate cause view of criminal liability have
uniformly applied it in situations where the felons either engaged in a gun battle or struggled with
the victim for control of the gun. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952)
(felons engaged in a gun battle); Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 251 S.W.2d 404 (1952)
(victim struggled with felon over control of the gun); Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla.
1955) (felons initiated a gun battle); Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336 (Okla. 1963) (felon seized
control of a policeman's gun and another officer fired, mistakenly killing the policeman).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

In the recent case of People v. Hickman,' the Illinois Supreme Court
extended the scope of the felony murder doctrine in Illinois to hold felons
criminally responsible for the death of a police officer mistakenly shot by a
fellow officer attempting to prevent the felony. This note will examine the
facts upon which Hickman was based, assess the development and scope of
the felony murder doctrine in Illinois prior to Hickman, and analyze the
reasoning of the court in adopting the tort concept of proximate cause as a
proper criterion of causation in a criminal homicide case.
People v. Hickman
On the evening of April 2, 1970, seventeen members of the Joliet police
force were conducting a surveillance of a liquor warehouse. Defendants
Hickman and Rock were observed breaking into the warehouse, while Papes,
a third defendant, remained posted outside. Shortly after Papes entered the
warehouse, the three men were seen leaving the building. As the police closed
in, the defendants fled toward a parking lot at the rear of the warehouse.
Papes was captured immediately and a search revealed a loaded pistol in his
jacket pocket. Hickman and Rock continued their attempt to escape, disregarding a warning shot and police orders to halt. One of the police officers
then observed a crouched figure running through the parking lot with a
handgun who did not respond to his warning to drop the gun. Believing the
crouched figure to be one of the burglars, the officer fired his shotgun. The
crouched figure proved to be a fellow police officer who subsequently died as
a result of the shotgun wound. Later that evening Hickman and Rock were
arrested on a nearby street. Neither was armed and the trial record disclosed
no evidence that either defendant was armed during the burglary. At the trial's
conclusion, the jury found Hickman and Rock guilty of murder and burglary.
Papes, who had been captured prior to the shooting, was found guilty of
burglary. Following the jury verdict, the trial court entered an order arresting
the judgment of murder against Hickman and Rock on the grounds that under
Illinois law, the felony murder rule is inapplicable when the fatal act is
committed by a non-felon acting in opposition to the felony.
On appeal, the appellate court for the third district reversed the lower
court's order and reinstated the murder convictions. 6 The case came to the
Illinois Supreme Court on a certificate of importance. Faced with the most
troublesome variation of the felony murder cases,8 where an innocent victim is
killed by a non-felon, the Hickman court, adopting a proximate cause theory
of liability, affirmed the murder convictions and held that a felon is criminally
5.
6.
7.
8.
has been
DICK. L.

59111. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974).
12 111.App. 3d 412, 297 N.E.2d 583 (1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 316 (1973).
For an annotated survey of the varied factual situations in which the felony murder rule
applied, see Hitchler, The Killer and His Potential Victim in Felony Murder Cases, 53
REV. 3 (1948).
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responsible for the lethal acts of a non-felon intervening in opposition to the
felony.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE IN ILLINOIS

Under the common law, in order to convict a person of murder, the state
had to prove malice aforethought.' This element was difficult to establish
when a felon accidentally or unintentionally killed someone during the
commission of a felony. The felony murder doctrine which developed in
response to this situation10 created a legal fiction of transferred intent whereby
the malice which adhered to the initial felony was deemed transferred to the
felon's homicidal act, thus supplying the element of malice necessary to prove
murder. The felony murder rule operated to impute malice to a felon's
homicidal act when malice did not expressly exist. Thus under the common
law analysis, the felony murder doctrine did not extend to every homicide
incidental to the commission of the felony; rather it included only those
killings where the causation of the homicide was direct, i.e., where the fatal
act was committed by the defendant or a co-felon in furtherance of the
unlawful purpose." "[I]n order for a felon to be guilty of the homicide, the
homicidal act (as in agency) must be either actually or constructively his."' 2
The present Illinois statutory scheme reflects the common law analysis.
Section 9-1 (a) (3) of the Illinois Criminal Code codifies the felony murder
rule and provides in part that a killing "without lawful justification" is murder
if committed while "attempting or committing a forcible felony 3 other than
9. Professor Perkins observed that the phrase "man-endangering-state-of-mind" means
"every attitude of mind which includes (1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict great bodily
injury, or (3) an intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human
risk..." Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J.CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 391, 407 (1946).
10. A widely accepted explanation of the origin of the doctrine is that at early common law,
most, if not all, felonies were punishable by death so that it was of little consequence whether the
felon was hanged for the initial felony or the homicide committed in furtherance of that felony. A
general discussion of the historical development of the felony murder rule is found in Crum,
Causal Relations and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191; Moesel, A Survey of
Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453 (1955). The doctrine has been abandoned in England since
1957. The English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2. c. II. § I provides:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offense, the
killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought
(express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in
the course or furtherance of another offense.
11. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958): "In adjudging a
felony murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a
killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of
homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirement of the felony murder doctrine." Id.
at 490, 137 A.2d at 476.
12. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 52, 167 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1960), citing the early
American cases which adhered to the agency theory of liability and refused to impute to a felon
the lethal act of a non-felon; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863),
(rioters protesting the Civil War draft not guilty of murder for the accidental shooting of a
bystander by a soldier attempting to suppress the riot). Butler v. People, 125 IIl. 641, 18 N.E.
338 (1888); see text accompanying note 20 infra.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1973) defines a forcible felony as "treason, murder,
voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery and any
other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual."
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voluntary manslaughter.' 4 Thus under the Illinois codification, the felony
murder rule imputes intent to the homicidal act but does not impute the
homicidal act from oner person to another. Section 9-1 of the felony murder
statute refers to a person "who kills", but does not expressly make his cofelons criminally liable. The responsibility of one person for the actions of
another evolved with the development of the doctrine of accountability. Under
this principle a defendant is held accountable for the acts of a co-felon
committed in furtherance of the felony. The accountability principle was
recognized early in Illinois in Brennan v. People, 5 and is codified in section 52 (c) which provides that:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: (c)
Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the
intent to promote or facilitate such commission he solicits, aids,
abets, agrees, or attempts to aid such other person in the planning or
commission of the offense.
Thus through the juxtaposition of the felony murder rule and the separate
principle of accountability, a felon can be held liable for murder when a cofelon kills someone in furtherance of the felony. The imposition of liability
under the common law application of the felony murder doctrine required the
presence of two factors: 1) the fatal act must have been done by the
defendant or a co-felon and 2) it must have been committed in furtherance of
the felony.
Language reflecting an adoption of the agency theory of liability underlying the traditional application of the felony murder doctrine was articulated in
early decisions rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court. Although the fatal
acts in these cases were commited by the defendant or a co-felon, the cases
gave the court the opportunity to set forth the underlying principles which
would be used in later cases to decide the extent of criminal liability for the
homicidal acts of non-felons.
In Brennan v. People," a defendant appealed his murder conviction
based on the homicidal act of one of his co-felons. Using an agency rationale
consistent with the traditional application of the felony murder doctrine, the
Brennan court held that the defendant could be found guilty of murder
provided the victim was "killed in the attempt to execute the common
purpose. If several persons conspire to do an unlawful act, and death happens
in the prosecution of the common object, all are alike guilty of the homicide.
The act of one of them done in furtherance of the original design, is, in the
14. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (a) (3) (1973) provides:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in
performing the acts which cause the death (3) He is attempting or committing a forcible
felony other than voluntary manslaughter.
15. 15 I11.
511 (1854). In finding defendants responsible for the homicidal act of a co-felon
the court observed: "It is sufficient that they combined with those committing the deed to do an
unlawful act, such as to beat or rob (the deceased) an that he was killed in the attempt to execute
the common purpose." Id. at 516.
16. Id.
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consideration of the law, the act of all."'" Similar language, holding that in
order to impose liability under the felony murder rule, the fatal act must be
committed by one of the felons and in furtherance of the felony, was
expressed by the court in Hanna v. People"s and Spies v. People."9
Butler v. People2 appears to be the first case arising in Illinois where the
court had the opportunity to articulate its view concerning the applicability of
the felony murder rule when a non-felon kills an innocent victim. In Butler,
when a town marshall attempted to suppress the rowdy conduct of the Butlers
and their companions, they responded by physically attacking him. During the
fight the marshall fired his gun and accidentally killed one of the bystanders.
Although the court ultimately found the defendants' action was not a felony,
thus precluding the operation of the felony murder rule, the Butler court set
forth a broad rule applicable to all homicides
with reasoning clearly applying
2
to situations in which a felony is involved: '
No person can be held responsible for a homicide unless the act was
either actually or constructively committed by him; and in order to
be his act, .it must be committed by his hand, or by someone acting
in concert with him, or in furtherance of a common design or
purpose. Where the criminal liability arisesfrom the act of another,
it must appear that the act was done in furtherance of the common
design, or in prosecution of the common purpose for which the
parties were assembled or combined.together. 2
Citing Commonwealth v. Campbell,3 an early Massachusetts case which
held that a felon could not be held responsible for the fatal act of one resisting
17.
18.

Id. at 516.
86 Ill. 243, 245 (1877). "If the defendant and those indicted with him had a common

design to do an unlawful act then in contemplation of the law whatever act any one of them did in
furtherance of the original design is the act of all."
19. 122 Ill. 1, 177, 12 N.E. 865, 951 (1887). "Where persons combine to stand by one
another in a breach of the peace with a general resolution to resist all opposers, and, in the
execution of their design a murder is committed all of the company are equally principals in the
murder . . . if the murder be in furtherance of the common design."
20. 125 Il. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888).
21. In Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 500, 137 A.2d 472, 478 (1958), the court
commented: "The rowdyism of the Butlers and their companions was a misdemeanor and not a
felony. But the principle involved is the same so far as defendants' criminal responsibility for the
marshall's unintentional killing of an innocent third party was concerned. At common law, a homo
cide committed by one acting in furtherance of a misdemeanor (at least one malum in se) is by
like token, voluntary manslaughter. . . malice not being imputed since the initial offense was not
a felony. And so the jury convicted the Butlers of voluntary manslaughter. But the Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed the judgments for the reason . . . that criminal responsibility is not imputable
to a wrongdoer for the homicidal effect of a resisting officer's accidental or unintentional killing of
an innocent bystander."
22. 125 Ill. at 645, 18 N.E. at 339.
23. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863). Campbell appears to be the earliest American case
which raised the question of whether a felon is criminally responsible for the fatal acts of a nonfelon. See note 12 supra.
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the felony, the Butler court added that it knew of no legal principle which
would hold the defendants liable for the acts of the marshall.24
Similar reasoning, reflecting continued adherence to the agency theory of
the felony murder rule, was expressed by the court in People v. Garippo.2 5 In
Garippo, surviving robbers were charged with the murder of an accomplice
shot during the course of a robbery by an unknown person. The case was
submitted to the jury with instructions which would have allowed conviction
even if there were no proof that the fatal act was committed by one of the
felons in furtherance of the felony. Citing Campbell and Butler with approval,
the court reversed the convictions noting that, "Under those instructions
plaintiffs in error might be held responsible for shooting done by another
person when there was no concert of action between him and them." 2
In the companion cases of People v. Grant2V and People v. Krauser,2s the
defendants participated in an armed robbery of a grocery store. A policeman
was killed while attempting to disarm Krauser. The store owner did not see
who fired the fatal shot, and Krauser testified that the policeman had control
of the gun when it went off. Grant appealed his murder conviction relying on
the agency theory that there could be no felony murder unless his co-felon did
the fatal shooting. In affirming the murder conviction, the Grant court found
that the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that during the struggle
one of the felons pointed the gun at the policeman even if he did not actually
pull the trigger. Adhering to the agency requirement, the court concluded that
the fatal act was done by one of the felons. 29 "Where two men are engaged in
a robbery and one kills a third party in pursuance of the robbery both are
equally guilty." 30
When Krauser appealed his murder conviction, the court reversed for
failure to give proper instructions on the defense of insanity. In a lengthy
opinion devoted largely to the insanity issue, the court dealt only incidentally
with the felony murder issue. In what could be viewed as a shift from the
traditional agency theory of liability, however the court said that it was
immaterial whose hand held the gun when it was fired. But since the court
24. 125 II1. at 646, 18 N.E. at 339. "They would be responsible for what they did
themselves, and for such consequences as might naturally flow from their acts and conduct, but
they never advised, encouraged, or assented to the acts of (the town marshall), nor did they in
any manner assent to anything he did and hence they could not be responsible for his conduct
toward the deceased."
25. 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920).
26. Id. at 300, 127 N.E. at 78.
27. 313 Il1. 69, 144 N.E. 813 (1924).
28. 31T Il. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925).
29. The state contended that the trigger was pulled by Grant or Krauser. Grant objected to
a jury instruction based on the state's contention because the only testimony presented was that
of Krauser who claimed that the policeman had killed himself. The court ruled that the state was
entitled to instructions presenting its theory of the case, implying that the question of who
committed the fatal act during the struggle for the gun was a question of fact for the jury to
decide.
30. 313 Ill. at 71, 144 N.E. at 816 (emphasis added).
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attributed the fatal act to Krauser, 3' even if the gun was in the policeman's
hand when fired, the Krauser court did no more than apply the agency
requirement to a factual determination that the fatal act was committed by a
felon in furtherance of the felony.
Surprisingly, Krauser was cited as authority for the court's holding in
People v. Payne,3" which seems to eliminate the agency requirement that the
homicidal act be committed by defendant or a co-felon in furtherance of the
felony. In Payne, the defendant agreed to direct his confederates to a home
they could rob. When the armed confederates reached the designated house,
one of the occupants fired his gun in an attempt to prevent the robbery. One
of the robbers returned the fire and during the exchange of shots the
occupant's brother was killed. Although there was no evidentiary finding on
who fired the fatal shot, the court affirmed Payne's murder conviction, citing
with approval the following passage from the Krauser opinion:
It might reasonably be anticipated that an attempted robbery would
meet with resistance, during which the victim might be shot either by
himself or someone else in attempting to prevent the robbery, and
those attemtping to perpetrate the robbery would be guilty of
murder.3"
Thus in Payne, the court appears to have shifted from an agency basis for
the imposition of criminal liability to a tort concept of proximate cause14 which
allows the imposition of liability when a killing is committed by a non-felon
resisting the felony, on the rationale that resistance with possible deadly
results is a foreseeable consequence of a felon's initial criminal act. Under the
proximate cause theory of criminal liability, the felony murder rule not only
transfers the mens rea underlying the initial felony to the subsequent
homicidal act, but by way of extension, also imputes to the felon the lethal act
of someone other than himself or a co-felon. Thus under this view, a felon is
guilty of murder if he is the initiating cause of a chain of events which results
in the death of a human being."
3 1. The court did not hold that Krauser was responsible for the lethal act of a non-felon.
Rather the court found that the act was Krauser's regardless of whose hand actually held the gun
when it was fired. "It was the act of (Krauser) whether his hand or (the policeman's) held the
revolver.
...
315 Ill.
at 506, 146 N.E. 601 (1925).
32. 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 537 (1935).
33. Id. at 254, 194 N.E. at 543 (emphasis added).
34. The proximate cause theory of criminal liability adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the well known case of Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949)
(defendant convicted of felony murder when a policeman, responding to felon initiated gunfire
killed an innocent bystander), was overruled in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa.
218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970), which reversed the murder conviction of one of the companions of
defendant in the Almeida case. In Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472
(1958), the court reversed a murder conviction based upon the death of defendant's co-felon shot
by a policeman resisting the felony. Redline overruled Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639,
117 A.2d 204 (1955) (defendant convicted of murder when his co-felon killed by a robbery
victim).
35. In his dissenting opinion in Redline, Justice Bell expressed the view that a strong public
policy, aimed at discouraging crime, dictated the extension of the felony murder rule: "The brutal
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Although Payne appears to articulate that the proximate cause theory is a
proper basis for the imposition of criminal liability under the felony murder
rule, the court fused both agency and proximate cause language when it
expressed its holding: "Where several persons conspire to do an unlawful act
and another crime is committed in the pursuit of the common object all are
alike guilty of the crime committed if it is a natural and probable consequence
6
of the execution of the conspiracy".
As authority for its holding, Payne relied on the Krauser case which
made a specific finding that the fatal act in struggling for control of the gun
was committed by one of the felons, thus meeting the agency requirement
consistent with the traditional application of the felony murder rule recognized
by prior Illinois decisions. Additionally, a limitation of the Payne holding to its
facts would place the decision in accord with two narrow exceptions to the
felony murder rule which do permit the imposition of liability for the fatal acts
of non-felons. In Payne, the felons engaged in a gun battle during which an
innocent victim was killed. The "gun battle" cases," as well as those cases
3
where a felon uses an innocent victim as a shield for purposes of escape, "
represent well recognized exceptions to the traditional felony murder doctrine.
The rationale underlying the imposition of liability in "gun battle" and
"shield" situations is that the felon's action in engaging in a gun battle or
erecting a shield are sufficiently provocative to be legally equated with the
39
actual fatal act committed by the resisting non-felon. An alternate rationale
crime wave which is sweeping and appalling our country can be halted only if the courts stop
coddling, and stop freeing murderers, communists, and criminals on technicalities made of straw.
The courts seem to have forgotten that justice is not a one-way street-law-abiding communities
are entitled, at least equally with criminals, to the protection of the law." 391 Pa. at 514, 137
A.2d at 483.
36. 359 I1. at 93, 194 N.E. at 543.
37. The California Supreme Court articulated the "gun battle" exception to the traditional
application of the felony murder rule in People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). During an attempted robbery, defendant's accomplice entered a service
station with his gun drawn, and was promptly shot and killed by the proprietor. Adhering to the
traditional application of the felony murder rule, the court reversed defendant's murder conviction
because the fatal act was committed by a non-felon resisting the felony. However the court noted
that felons who initiate gun battles could be found guilty of murder if their victims resist and kill
"and it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony murder doctrine." Id. at 781. In
People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965) defendants Initiated a
gun battle during an attempted robbery and one of the felons was killed by a policeman. The court
held the surviving felons guilty of murder since they initiated the gun battle. In Taylor v. Superior
Court of Alameda County, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970) the court
broadened its "gun battle" exception to include conduct by felons who engage in gun battles
initiated by a robbery victim.
38. Several states have imposed criminal liability for the fatal acts of non-felons where
defendants use innocent persons as shields to aid in the felony or escape. Keaton v. State, 41
Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961
(1900); Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); State v. Kress, 105 N.J. Super.
Ct. 514, 253 A.2d 481 (1969). These cases present a limited exception to the traditional rule
that there is no liability for the fatal acts of non-felons, relying on the rationale that the fatal act is
placing the human shield in the path of opposition gunfire.
39. In Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934) the court found that the
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suggested by some courts is that when a felon engages in acts that are likely to
kill, with a conscious disregard for human life, the killing by the non-felon is
attributable to the intentional death-inducing act of the felon. Thus since
malice can be shown by the facts, it is unnecessary to transfer malice by
40
involving the felony murder doctrine.
Limiting the Payne holding to the factual situation which supports it, it is
arguable that Payne merely stands for the proposition that when a felon
engages in a gunfight during the commission of a forcible felony, and an
innocent party is killed by one resisting the felony, the homicide is attributable
to the felon under a limited exception to the felony murder rule. Payne left
uncertain whether the court retained the traditional agency view of the felony
murder rule, and merely imposed liability because the felons engaged in a gun
battle; or whether the decision represents a complete abandonment of the
agency requirement in favor of a proximate cause theory of liability.
People v. Morris4I resolved one aspect of this uncertainty. In Morris, the
defendant and two companions engaged in an armed robbery. When one of
the robbery victims resisted, a gunfight erupted and one of the felons was
killed by a bullet from his own gun. The Appellate Court for the First District
held that a surviving robber could not be held liable for the murder of his
accomplice by a non-felon. Adopting the rationale of Commonwealth v.
Redline 4 the Morris court said that since the victim was a felon, the homicide
was justifiable and therefore would not support a murder charge. Expressing
its holding in familiar agency language, the court indicated that the felony
murder rule would not extend liability for the homicidal acts of non-felons
regardless of the status of the victim: 43 "In order to meet the requirements of
the felony murder doctrine, it is necessary that the conduct causing death was
an act done in furtherance of the common design to commit a forcible
felony."' 4 Thus, if Payne represented a departure from the agency requirement of the felony murder rule, Morris appears to reflect its reaffirmation.
felon's action in erecting a human shield was as much the cause of the victim's death as if the
felon had fired the fatal bullet himself.
40. Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 477
P.2d 131 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958),
where the court suggested that in the Texas and Arkansas "shield" cases malice was not imputed
by defendants' participation in the initial felony, but rather express malice was found in the act of
placing an innocent person in the path of hostile gunfire.
41. 1 Ill. App. 3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1st Dist. 1971).
42. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). The court reversed a murder conviction based on
the killing of the defendant's co-felon by a policeman. The court reasoned that since the killing of
the co-felon was justifiable, the defendant could not be convicted for the consequences of the
policeman's lawful conduct.
43. The Redline distinction, based on the character of the victim, was found without merit
in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). In holding that the
felony murder doctrine is not applicable when the killing is done by one resisting the felony, and
the victim is an innocent third party, Myers represents a complete abandonment of the proximate
cause theory of liability by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court commented that it was
giving Almeida its proper burial, "taking it out of its limbo and plunging it downward into the
bowels of the earth." Id. at 237, 261 A.2d at 559-60.
44. 1111. App. 3d at 570, 274 N.E.2d at 901.
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THE

Hickman

OPINION

It was against this background that the supreme court agreed to hear the
Hickman appeal. Considering first the wording of the felony murder statute, 4"
the court candidly acknowledged that a literal interpretation could support the
defendants' contention that in order for the felony murder rule to apply, the
fatal act must be committed by a felon or co-felon in furtherance of the
felony.4 6 Conceding its arguability, the court rejected defendants' statutory
analysis as being too narrow. In its construction of section 9-1 (a) (3), the
court held that a felon can be held accountable for the homicidal act of a nonfelon intervening in opposition to the felony on the basis of its prior holding in
People v. Payne."7 The court referred to the Krauser passage 48 cited in Payne,
and noted further that in the committee comments to section 9-1 (a) (3), the
drafters, relying on Payne, said that when a killing occurs during the course of
a felony it is immaterial whether the killing was committed by the defendant, a
co-felon, "or even by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the
felony." 4 9
Treating Payne as standing for the proposition that proximate cause is a
proper basis for extending liability for the fatal acts of non-felons under the
felony murder rule, the court found that it was the intention of the drafters of
the felony murder statute to incorporate therein the Payne holding, thus
making section 9-1 (a) (3) dispositive of the issue raised in Hickman. Morris
was not cited or distinguished. 0 In further support of its holding, the court
relied on its recent decision in People v. Allen," where a policeman was killed
when robbers initiated a gun battle in their attempt to escape. Although an
investigation was unable to determine whether the fatal shot was fired by a
felon or a police officer, the Allen court affirmed the defendant's murder
conviction, holding that "under the facts of this case the defendant was
accountable regardless of who fired the fatal shot." 5
Again, as in Payne, the Allen facts establish the presence of the "gun
battle" exception to the traditional application of the felony murder rule.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (a) (3) (1973). See note 14 supra.
46. By the statute's own language, the "person who kills" or performs "the acts which
cause the death" must be the same person who is "attempting or committing a forcible felony."
The statute makes no provision for a murder charge where the person who kills is acting in
opposition to the felony.
47. 359 I1. 246, 194 N.E. 537 (1935).
48. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
49. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1, Committee Comments 9 (Smith Hurd 1972).
50. Presently in Illinois under the Morris and Hickman decisions, if a policeman shoots
and kills a felon, a surviving accomplice would not be charged with murder; but if the bullet
missed the felon and hit a bystander, the accomplice would be guilty of murder. Criminal liability
based on such a fortuitious event has led one court to comment: "A distinction based on the
person killed, however, would make the defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship
of victims and policemen. A rule of law cannot reasonably be based on such a fortuitious
circumstance." People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 132, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442, 444 (1965).
51. 56 111. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974).
52. Id. at 540, 309 N.E.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
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However, the Hickman court elected to disregard the distinction between the
felon-initiated gunfire present in Allen and the unarmed escape attempt in
Hickman. Rather than comparing the provocative nature of the defendants'
conduct in both cases, the court looked only at the similar result stemming
from each course of conduct. Accordingly, both the initiation of a gun battle
and an unarmed escape attempt were unlawful precipitating factors which
effected identical results: "The escape here had the same effect as did the
gunfire in Allen in that it invited retaliation, opposition and pursuit. Those
who commit forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to
their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape." 5 3 Applying clear
proximate cause language, the Hickman court stated that the fatal shot fired
in opposition to the felons' escape was a direct and foreseeable consequence
of the defendants' felonious conduct. Since their unlawful acts precipitated the
foreseeable act of resistance, the defendants were criminally responsible for
the consequences of that resistance.
In concluding, the Hickman court acknowledged that a contrary result
would obtain in those jurisdictions, which, adhering to the traditional application of the felony murder rule, refuse to extend liability for the fatal acts of
non-felons except in "gun battle" or "shield" situations. However, the court
stated that Illinois statutory and case law dictated the "preferable" Hickman
result.
CONCLUSION

That the Hickman result was dictated by the statutory language of the
felony murder rule or prior case law is questionable. The Illinois felony
murder statute makes no provision for the imposition of liability where the
fatal act is committed in opposition to a felony; and Payne, which the court
found to be controlling, articulated a hybrid rationale which fused both agency
and proximate cause language in its application of the felony murder rule.
Clearly, the Hickman decision established a significant expansion of the
felony murder rule in Illinois. In effect, the court has unequivocally adopted a
broad tort concept of proximate cause as the basis for imposing criminal
liability under the felony murder rule; and more importantly, has elected to
use this theory of liability on facts clearly distinguishable from a "gun battle"
or "shield" situation. Thus the court has resolved any doubt that the cautious
proximate cause language used in prior cases would be limited to the facts
there presented. With the Hickman decision, liability for the lethal acts of
non-felons extends beyond the "gun battle" scenario. Presently in Illinois,
absent a Morris situation where the victim is a co-felon, the felony murder
rule will apply no matter whose act accomplishes the killing, so long as that
act is a foreseeable consequence of defendant's felonious conduct.
53.

59 III. 2d at 94, 319 N.E.2d at 516.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

No other jurisdiction presently extends the felony murder doctrine to
impose liability in a Hickman situation." The consistent trend in other
jurisdictions has been to restrict the use of the felony murder rule to its
common law application, and impose liability only when the homicidal act is
committed by a felon or co-felon in furtherance of the felony." This trend
reflects the premise that there must be a more direct causal connection
between the criminal conduct of the defendant and the homicide committed
than is required by the tort liability concept of proximate cause.
One solution proposed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code, would avoid the harsh effect of the felony murder doctrine in a
Hickman situation without abolishing the doctrine itself. The Code suggests
that the felony murder rule be modified to raise only a rebuttable presumption
of the mens rea required for murder rather than the conclusive presumption
that is now operative. 6 Such a presumption could have been successfully
rebutted by the defendants in Hickman. Legislative enactment of this type
would more properly balance the relationship between criminal liability and
moral culpability.
KATHLEEN HARRINGTON

54. Those jurisdictions which have adopted the proximate cause theory of liability in felony
murder cases have limited its application to "gun battle" or "struggle" situations See note 4
supra.
55. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v. Majors, 237
S.W. 486, (1922); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); People v. Washington, 62
Cal. 2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers,
438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766

(1973).
56.
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